Another Cheapo Networking Bootstrap ID

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This topic contains 10 replies, has 2 voices, and was last updated by  Josh Stern January 8, 2023 at 5:56 am.

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  • #123686

    josh

    Q:What is “onion” addressing good for in the GT context?

    A: The goal is to prevent detection of who is sending network messages to who. In implementations like Tor it fails due to lots of hacks that are outside the scope of the protocol. These outside hacks are still issues in the GT context but implementing an agile system with awareness of them helps limit the rate of detection & how hard it is to do that. Deep State military mafia has expressed in various ways that it pursues the goal declaring GT in general, particular GT members, and all alternative organizations of significance as enemies to attack. At the level of indvidually addressable stuff on the Internet, it is willing to take the transitive closure of all communications & label that as a theoretical enemy, to be attacked in some order of convenience. Slowing that down & making it more work to compute is helpful to GT. In this discussion, that is also aided by using more “foot” level websites & backups. Screen hacking is still a big issue among others, but that is a lot easier when Deep State is focused on particular people from other cues. There again, onion networking is not practically sound, but it can be helpful.

  • #123720

    josh

    Q: What protocol for potential recovery/password extra protect?

    A: Until biometrics are added, then users are advised to keep the pen drive on their person & treat it like a dongle. There can be a programmatic option to attempt recovery that may engage with some protocol of pass/images etc. distributed between their brain & online sites.

  • #123809

    josh

    This provisional scheme, as I describe it depends on starting with a team certfied/formatted usb stick or equivalent, delivered by a trusted distribution channel. The feedback was good, but many are still not connected. One kind of feature that seems to be needed is more availability of physical couriers who can drop off secure materials & check in on the disconnected. These could be scheduled via a favor trading system as previously described.

  • #123810

    josh

    One of the perceived weaknesses is this: FBI etc is still making a strong effort to track all significant GT contributors & jack all of their telecom with selective MITM & denial of service. To work around this, GT should implement strategies that make it hard to claim working service if one calls support for a line – e.g. a network of links dynamically dedicated to fighting such problems, with special tie ins from the USB distribution.

  • #123819

    josh

    If some folks get me one or more USB that I can use to connect to something that feels real & helpful to me (not a trick) then I promise to try & wire funds to cover your expenses plus profit.

  • #124199

    Josh Stern
    Moderator

    A new idea for bootstrapping network awareness & participation & distribution:

    The Crypto Blog Player:

    Similar issues, with these twists:

    Crypto Blog player is for read-only consumption of network supported blog “streams”.

    Crypto Blog player is downloadable as open source recipes & binaries with instructions for how to check hash correctness etc. Correctness is also checked when it connects to the network sites. Again, we can use a mixture of Let’s encrypt and custom crypto inside. Here, integrity of the distributors is conceptually like a PGP network concept, automatically checked by open source software. Integrity of the received content is based on custom crypto protocols that make it an unreasonably expensive pain in the ass to custom censor/edit Joe364564’s custom stream. Since blog is delayed in time anyway, one trick we can use is a local reassembly of content from scrambled transmissions.

    Crypto blog player connect gives us a legal out way to advise & consent to the appropriateness of different channel sources that the user selects.

    PGP/PKey facing the user is simply a check that they are behaving, not running denial of service attacks, etc.

    Distribution of interactive content is also possible. But the main idea is that we are not validating user ids or goods, simply behaving network nodes consuming content of interest that they agree is suitable for them.

    • #124317

      Josh Stern
      Moderator

      People with ICs are very respectful of “the source of some info (not really a friend)” vs. no hidden info channel. Blog player could be a lot more popular & could be segmented & advertised for different audiences, who also connect to different portals. Inside, all of the channels that GT wants to be made available to a given person would be available in some ready way. Policy could figure out about what if anything prevents use with unendorsed channels or copycat drown outs.

      My 2p is to pick styles including salient content that spook won’t emulate directly and advertise.

      Most all of my 2p are ignored through a combination of spook crushing decision makers & giving others fear of that. So most serious proposals need to be more educated about the reality of security & how to manage it.

  • #124223

    Josh Stern
    Moderator

    Q: These things are designed for regular computing & not ICs. What about extensions?

    A: I’ve written a number of posts about the desirability of providing wireless security for ICs and using networks that don’t depend on unauthorized or military authorized transport for distance. So we can imagine various wireless IC hubs that connect to Internet devices, for example. Hub & a set of wearable IC helpers could be made available as a kit.

  • #125040

    Josh Stern
    Moderator

    The messages I hear are often from spooks. This is unfortunately, true for many others who get in hot ave/BOD isolation as soon as they are perceived as significant to GT or to me. Much more effort is needed to overcome the hurdles. The filtered communication continues, at spook urging, to focus on the issue of getting cut off from using their low quality, no security, low bandwidth, high latency IC switching systems that go through security zones they control in many cases.

    Why hasn’t the discussion at least achieved a common network space of message boards & individual messaging based on the sort of std. IP for purchase on ramps described here? Why isn’t techniques for retry/specific routing etc. getting everyone connected at this sort of quality level, which is still a lot better than mafia IC?

  • #125896

    Josh Stern
    Moderator

    I’m trying to ask folks about what happened to this idea, which I believed would be a hit if it wasn’t replaced by something better. It’s absolutely essential for GT folks to focus on useful networking that carries precise info & is not being done over channels controlled by the military mafias.

    I get no answer from allies about it. Spooks who I don’t trust claim that people who tried it were attacked & harmed by them & others were intimidated not to do it on that basis. Why is the story?
    Is it?

    a) It’s a filtered topic so no info about it will reach me
    b) Everyone capable of organizing is surrounded by too many spooks to get it started
    c) Spooks are telling the sad truth
    d) Everyone left it to someone else & nobody picked up the ball
    e) something else?

    From here, the team looks to be falling apart as an organization, gradually being replaced by isolated spook run dog & pony shows which will generate entertainment for other spooks while achieving nothing. Is that what you see where you are?

    Edit: One kind of answer says that too many of the programming team are still on what amounts to mafia T’s, which block the production of such helpful organizing efforts or their distribution. I was under the impression that more progress had been made in getting away from the mafia T’s. Would appreciate more pointers about where they are too be found & more encouragement for others to pick up the ball.

    Edit 2: Others say that “influences” somehow persuaded key groups to stay with a focus on the ICs via utilities, which of course can be turned off at will by enemy military mafias as well as freely edited/blocked/manipulated/stored for later playback by the same mafias.

    This case should be verbalized & focused on for an example of how the spy influence is able to integrate & completely destroy cooperative engineering effort, turning it into a trap for icy abduction of non-mafia participants with no serious analysis happening even on the inside engineering teams.

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