Sneakernets (for GT & resistors)

[josh]

Clarifying – My comment above was assuming the use of things like low cost USB sticks, with software that runs on Android,iPhone, PC, game console, etc. I was not proposing or assuming anything about a special device that would prevent tampering. The latter would be higher cost & harder to hide, but also harder to tamper with maliciously. The USB stick can include elements of blockchain tech, & locally stored checkpointing to inhibit tampering at the community level.

[josh]

Adding some more thoughts about these designs, while continuing with the analogy to Internet & Onion Routing with respect to functions/limitations & problems due to the reality of mafia governments that violently oppose privacy & free speech, secretly & sometimes publicly.

Consider the OSI model of Data Networks which includes 7 ordered layers supporting network applications, with each layer dependent on the service organization of the layers below it. Sneakernet also has layers – the most basic issues are who is available in your physically accessible environment that you continue to trust today for a. message passing via Sneakernet, b. making an attempt to let you know if they are leaving the network, adding a list of other recommendations of local people you can trust to participate, adding or changing public key infrastructure for the network, offering new protocols/applications at the higher level. GT networks involve telecom networking & financial connections & it’s likely that info about those things will be transmitted at times via some protocols/apps over Sneakernets.

The Tor Network, which continues to exist, was the most famous example of Onion Networks – at a computer science level it was a successful (though not the last word or perfect) design & remains operational. At the level of actually providing privacy it failed because FBI/Deep State monitors at the level of your residence & takes over the exit nodes of the network where the traffic was no longer encrypted, & does timing attacks to find where the traffic went, etc. The design is premised on the assumption of networks of anonymous, loosely affiliated actors operating in good faith, in accordance with the public laws, & that isn’t like the actual reality of our modern environment. In order to become successful & remain so, Snearkernet requires a tighter focus on trust, with levels of trust, robust checking, expectations of attacks, & mechanisms to excise bad actors. Another issue is that govt. actors may attack the legitimacy of individuals using cryptography or passing secret, third-party messages. They will use false flags to create incidents & loudly publish lurid accounts of that using their predatory media outlets, who are now just military mafia spies working for the same govt. The main antidotes to this are a) circumspect behavior, steganography to hide encryption, and vigorous civics insisting on the literal rights of the law & not heavy-handed-govt. intimidation which is explicitly viewed as adversarial. Explictl plots to do something violent, harm other people, or overthrow the govt. are often illegal. Network policy should include statements about opposing those usages along with other criminal endeavors as a matter of operating safety & legal protection. Legal attacks on the network itself are generally based on arguments of culpability for encouraging illegal & harmful activity. So token opposition to such is one helpful antidote for operating safety.

[josh]

Another sort of interesting tool for sneakernet would be a media containing an executable & data which led users to edit their own contributions into a kind of standard template for a MPEG-2 DVD that they can burn with the added material/edits.

[Author]

Posts